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THE ANTI-EMPATHIC TURN

ROBIN WEST

Justice, according to a broad consensus of our greatest twentieth century judges, requires a
particular kind of moral judgment, and that moral judgment requires, among much else,
empathy–the ability to understand not just the situation but also the perspective of litigants on
warring sides of a lawsuit. In the 1920s, for example, Justice Benjamin Cardozo extolled the
virtue and necessity of a broad-ranging empathy in his classic essay on the judicial craft, along
with that of fidelity, reason, and wisdom.1 In the 1970s, the great Ninth Circuit Judge John
Noonan wrote an entire book on the topic, called The Persons and Masks of the Law, in which he
argued with considerable passion that good judging–even appellate judging–must be grounded in
an empathic bond between judge and litigant, and not solely on abstract rules that govern entities
(and that Justice Cardozo lacked the capacity to develop such a bond).2 Judge Richard Posner has
recently opined that judging can’t proceed without empathy–regardless of the pragmatic end the
judge chooses to pursue.3 Thus, while Posner has dropped his earlier steadfast insistence on
efficiency as the goal of adjudication in favor of a more pragmatic utilitarianism, he has retained
his insistence that the ability to understand the goals of others is of the essence of the art of
judging. Current sitting Supreme Court Justice Breyer noted at his confirmation hearings that as
a judge, he needs to be able to empathize broadly with all sorts of people who might be very
different from anyone in his circle of family, friends, and acquaintances, and he found narrative
literature–he mentioned Jane Eyre in particular–an invaluable source to help him in that effort.4
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Recently retired Justice Stevens also has urged that the ability to decide cases wisely and
humanely depends in part–only in part, but nevertheless in substantial part–on just this empathic
capacity.5 This list could be vastly extended. It’s fair to say, in fact, that throughout most of the
twentieth century, as well as much of the nineteenth it would be hard to find an idea more basic
or unchallenged, either in the self-reflective writings of judges, or in legal scholarship, or in folk
wisdom. One simply cannot judge another before walking in his shoes. Indeed, to suggest
otherwise might be thought to be disqualifying.
It’s particularly easy to see why empathic excellence has been such a familiar judicial
ideal in a common law system such as ours, or for that matter in any system in which judges
reason, at least much of the time, by way of analogy. A common law judge, after all, reasoning
in the way central to common law adjudication, must decide if this case, litigant, or injury is like
that one, in order to reach a decision in virtually every matter that comes before him. He must
decide if this litigant in this tort case today behaved in a way like that one in yesterday’s, or if
this contract clause, damage, or breach is like that one, if this transaction is like that one, if this
defendant and that defendant are similarly situated. Likes, after all, must be treated alike. Formal
justice, stare decisis, the rule of precedent, and virtually any conceivable understanding of the
rule of law all require as much.6 Is a malformed hand damaged by a botched operation which
was itself induced by a promise that the hand could be made perfect, really like a broken machine
part that comes with a warranty? Is it enough like a broken machine that it would be appropriate
to apply a damage rule from the law of contract designed for the latter to the former, rather than a
damage rule taken from tort principles governing negligence?7 Is the doctor's promise to make
the hand whole enough like the manufacturer's promise that the machine will work, such that it
makes sense to view both of these promises as warranties?8 Is the loss of an opportunity to have
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an operation that might have, but more likely would not have extended a life, occasioned by a
negligently faulty diagnosis, enough like the loss of life suffered by negligent commission of
surgery, such as to justify a malpractice remedy for the loss of a slight chance at a substantially
longer life?9 Is this woman who has been denied a promotion, a jury of her peers, or a social
security benefit because of gender enough like a man who has suffered a legal liability because
of his race, to warrant the application of constitutional principles intended to forbid state-based
racial discrimination to discrimination based on gender?10 Is sex really like race in that way; is
sexism really like racism in that way? Is this couple that is not allowed to marry denied some
fundamental right?11 Is the right to marry really enough like the right to speech, assembly,
privacy, and so forth as to warrant an extension of principles first meant to govern the latter, to
the former? Is an unmarried individual’s decision to take birth control really like the decision of a
married couple to do so, such as to justify extending principles of familial privacy designed for
the latter, to the situation of the former?12 And so on. To answer any of these questions, one must
know a bit, often quite a bit, about machines, hands, the nature of promises, surgery, the art of
diagnosis, the history of racism, the institution of marriage. And one must know, of course, quite
a bit about the law of warranty, of contract, of negligence, of the Fourteenth Amendment, of
what the Court held and did not hold in Griswold,13 or Skinner14 and so on. But one must also
know something about feelings of loss: what does it feel like to lose the use of a hand, or to lose
even just a slight possibility of years of life? One must know something about pain: what might
that injury feel like? How does it feel to be denied something that was promised? One must
know something about desire, and need, and frustration: what is the basis of the need, or desire,
to marry, to have one’s intimate relations sanctified by the state as well as by religious authority?
How does it feel to be denied something important because of an “immutable characteristic?”
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One must likewise know something about the subjective feel of promising, and of warranting,
and of diagnosing, and of discriminating. Analogous reasoning by definition seemingly requires
empathic understanding, at least where it is people’s utterly subjective situations, problems,
fears, anxieties, suffering, opportunities, dreams, and foibles, from which, and to which, one is
analogizing. And, adjudication does proceed largely, albeit not entirely, by analogy. For that
reason alone, some level of empathic ability, one might think, is a requisite of any judging in a
common law or case-method system that’s worthy of the name. Excellent judging requires
empathic excellence. Empathic understanding is, in some measure, an acquired skill as well as,
in part, a natural ability. Some people do it well; some, not so well. Again, this has long been
understood, and has been long argued, particularly, although not exclusively, by some of our
most admired judges and justices.
Somehow, however, this idea, viewed as so utterly mainstream for much of the last
century’s worth of writing about judging, has, in the first decade of the twenty first century,
become positively toxic, at least in the context of confirmation battles to the Supreme Court.
Through the course of those battles, by both Senators and judicial nominees themselves, we
citizens are now very publicly being taught that empathic judging is not only not something to
strive for in judging, it is something to avoid or even abhor. Empathy itself, we’re told, is
contrary to the rule of law. It is the precursor to impermissible activist judging. It runs the danger
of sentimentalism. It is the very opposite of judicious behavior, or outlook. Judges should be like
umpires, so said our current Chief Justice, calling balls and strikes.15 And umpires, obviously,
need not and should not empathize with the need of a batter to improve his batting average so as
to fatten his wallet or of a pitcher to save his career with a lower ERA, or of a small and
overmatched child in a little league contest to improve his self esteem. Similarly, judges should
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not favor or hold out hope for the poor, the disadvantaged, or the oppressed; judges should apply
the rule of law. What’s good for the goose is likewise for the gander; the same law must apply to
the international corporation as the impoverished individual. Empathy can’t play a part. Judges,
said Justice Sotomayor, need not be any more empathic than any other citizen, and the idea that
they should, she reminded us all, was the President’s notion, not hers.16 Judges should apply the
rule of law. Judges should be open-minded, Justice Kagan said, not so as to better understand
every American that comes before them, but so as to give every American a “fair shake.”17
Nobody's against a “fair shake.” Empathy is not what’s required, according to Kagan,
Sotomayor, and Roberts, as well as the anti-empathy senators that quizzed them all, but rather,
objectivity and open-mindedness. If these confirmation battles are any guide, we have all
collectively taken, we might say, an anti-empathic turn in our very crowded path of the law.
What was once regarded as non-problematically central to good judging is now regarded as
antithetical to it. No one challenged this claimed antipathy between empathy and judicial
excellence. How did that happen?
Maybe this particular turn in our thinking about law and judging is one of those things
that are over-determined. One hardly need search long and hard for explanations. Perhaps we
have become a less empathic and less caring society, with less ability to perceive the situation of
others. We’ve made ourselves un-empathic, so there’s no point in lauding empathy as a virtue, or
a skill or capacity that grounds virtue, judicial or otherwise, if we're not very good at it any more.
Maybe we have become too polarized along lines of difference to notice the common humanity
among us, or maybe we have all played too many video games or answered too many emails for
empathy to have any purchase, as critics of cyber-culture have long warned might happen,
because we spend too many hours in front of boxes rather than human beings. There are other
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possibilities. In the constitutional context, the anti-empathy turn might be–indeed, it seems to be–
a rhetorical arrow in a quiver that is squarely aimed at a cluster of cases embraced by two
consecutive liberal activist Courts over the course of two decades: not at judicial activism in
general, but at Roe,18 Griswold,19 Miranda,20 and a handful of other cases that famously aided
pregnant women, criminal defendants, sexual libertines, and other outsider groups, and did so
with no clear text in the constitution mandating that outcome. That’s possible. Maybe, as a few
commentators have argued, the target of the anti-empathy argument is not empathy per se, but
selective empathy: perhaps liberal and progressive judges have over-empathized with pregnant
women and under-empathized with fetal life or the moral sensibilities of pro-life citizens, or have
over-empathized with tort victims injured by faulty products, and under-empathized with the
consumers who will pay the higher prices, and possibly lose the benefit of the consumer surplus
that might come from cheaper albeit more dangerous lawn mowers and kitchen appliances.21 As
argued somewhat obliquely by Herbert Wechsler in a classic law review article on the topic,
maybe some of those progressive justices in the Warren Court years over-empathized with those
wanting to socialize with those of different races, and under-empathized with those preferring
not to.22 The critique of empathy-in-judging stemming from this line of complaint then is really a
critique of selective empathy, and the bias to which it leads. A collective sense among the
empathy critics that there's no sensible way to engage in empathic judgment and at the same time
guard against this selectivity might account for some of the impetus behind this turn.
There's one other possible explanation for the anti-empathic turn that appears
prominently in the recent scholarly literature on this topic. As has been argued by a number of
“emotion scholars” in law schools–and with particular force recently by Susan Bandes–the antiempathy turn in our thinking about law might be proceeding apace on the basis of a sizeable
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definitional mistake.23 Empathy is not sympathy, Bandes and others (including an early piece in
the evolution of empathy literature by Lynne Henderson24) remind us. Empathy tells us, perhaps,
something about what others are feeling, or at least gives us a hint of its feel. It is a source of
information. Sympathy, by contrast, is the moral sentiment that aligns our interest with that of
another in pain.25 And if we keep the distinction firmly in mind, we can clear up a lot of the
confusion, these scholars urge, which has prompted the anti-empathic turn. Empathy, just as the
twentieth century jurists argued, truly is necessary to adjudication and, as modern or postmodern
skeptics might add, is always already present in any event. But empathy simply gives the
empathizer, including the judicial empathizer, access to a certain kind of knowledge–knowledge
of the perspective of others. Empathy is not what motivates action. Sympathy is what motivates
action. So, the overly sentimental judge who sympathizes with someone in pain–the tort victim,
the downtrodden, the poorer of two litigants–may well be led astray by this unleashed moral
emotion, if, say, he is inclined to sympathize with those in the most immediate pain, or the most
readily cognizable pain, or the pain with which he is most familiar, or the pain of those whose
interests he politically favors. The judge must guard against all of these possibilities of bias, and
accordingly should reason, not feel, his way to the right conclusion. But empathy is not the
culprit, at least according to the empathy scholars. It’s unleashed sympathy that is out of place.
Empathy is what the judge needs in order to analogize sensibly. Sympathy is what he needs to
keep in check, if he is to apply the rule of law.
There may be some truth to all of these accounts, and quite a bit to the last. It is indeed
possible to empathize with someone’s situation and not sympathize: “I understand what you’re
going through, but you get no sympathy from me.” Susan Bandes is right to insist on the
distinction. In the remainder of this essay, however, I want to explore a different possible
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explanation for the anti-empathic turn in jurisprudence, albeit one that is compatible with
Bandes'. The anti-empathy turn currently being expressed or implicitly endorsed by very high
ranking judges and justices in our understanding of judicial ideals, I will argue, is also a part of a
larger shift in our paradigm of what good judging should be. That paradigm shift, I believe, is
most clearly revealed, not in the Supreme Court confirmation battles that spill over on the front
pages of newspapers, but in the pages of law review articles and in the law school classroom. Its
consequence, I will argue, is sharply felt, not only or even primarily in the Supreme Court’s
handling of the major social and constitutional issues of our time (which are better explained by
political ideology), but rather, in scholarly treatment of the common law of contract and tort–
areas of law that have for a couple of centuries now formed the core of our understanding of the
judicial craft. The anti-empathic turn, I want to argue, is a part of a “paradigm shift”– with
apologies for the cliché–in our ideals of good judging, and it's the perhaps unintended
consequences of that paradigm shift that I want to explore.
The paradigm shift I’ll describe represents a culmination, or vindication, of Justice
Holmes’s audacious claim, in “The Path of the Law,” at the beginning of the century just closed
that the common law lawyer and common law judge of the future–that would be us, now–will be
the masters of economics, statistics and the slide rule, rather than the masters of Blackstone or
black letter law.26 The new paradigm of good judging, Holmes predicted, would eventually
depend heavily on quantitative sociological and economic tools of prognosis and prediction, and
would have much less need for either Blackstone or common law precedent. In that regard, the
new paradigm–which I'll sometimes call “scientific judging”–is forward-looking; it looks to the
consequences of decisions, rather than backward-looking to the governing law drawn from the
past. Economics and sound policy fill the space once filled by engagement with past cases. There
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has been a transformation of that on which judges should rely in reaching their decisions, from
rules laid down in the past to present understandings of future wellbeing, from precedent to
social policy, from reliance on analogical reasoning based on past cases to economic or
sociological reasoning based on welfare baselines. This shift is much noted, and usually,
although not always, with approval (particularly by the academic left, but also by the libertarian
right). Less noted, although most significant for these purposes, is this: the new paradigm has
virtually no need for a judge who is capable of empathic engagement with litigants. In fact, it has
little need for engagement with litigants of any sort, empathic or otherwise. Empathy is simply
not a part of the paradigmatically modern judicial skill set. This, I will argue, should count as a
significant cost.
I will not attempt to prove that this new paradigm has taken hold, or even that it is clearly
articulated in any single source (other than in Holmes’s “Path of the Law”). Rather, in the
remainder of this essay, I would like to closely explore just one piece of datum exemplifying this
shift in our paradigm of good judging, by examining the evolution of the scholarly treatment of
the “unconscionability” rule in contract law over the course of the last several decades. The
unconscionability rule is generally understood to be, along with undue influence, constructive
fraud, and requirements of good faith, one of a number of so-called “policing” doctrines (as in,
“policing the contract”) that regulate the fairness of contracts. The fairly dramatic shift that has
occurred in the last quarter century in our understanding of policing doctrines in contract law in
general, and the unconscionability doctrine in particular, I will contend, is emblematic of the
larger shift in our paradigm of judging–a shift away not only from precedent, but also from
empathic regard for litigants, and toward instead a concern with the welfare-enhancing
consequences of decisions for future contractors. The social welfare that ought to be the primary
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concern of the judge, according to the scientific paradigm, is then defined in such a way that
empathy for the class of those other persons – persons other than the litigant whose future
welfare is being expanded or shrunk by the judge's decision – need not be employed. Rather, the
welfare of those persons to which the judge should attend is defined by reference to observable,
quantifiable behaviors that can be reckoned in fully non-empathic ways. There is no need to
learn of their subjectivities through empathic understanding or otherwise. Empathy need not be
in the toolkit.
In the first section below, I contrast the traditional and more contemporary approach to
the unconscionability doctrine, using the iconic case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company,27 and its scholarly treatment, as emblematic. In the second, I briefly explain how, in
my view, this shift in the scholarly treatment of Williams v. Walker-Thomas (and related policing
doctrines more generally) is reflective of and in some ways masks a larger shift in our guiding
paradigm of adjudication–a shift away from a paradigm of moral judging to scientific judging. In
the third and concluding section, I will offer some suggestions as to why this new paradigm has
taken such a hold on our legal imaginations, and will briefly criticize it, both specifically with
respect to the unconscionability doctrine, and more generally. I will urge a return to a more
classical understanding–one which rested quite explicitly on the centrality not only of precedent
(Blackstone, common law rules and so on) but also of moral passions and moral emotions to the
work of judging, of which empathy and sympathy both are sizeable parts. Mostly, though, in this
essay I just want to put in the record, so to speak, a piece of evidence for the claim that we have
seemingly turned our back on a vision of moral judging that once embraced what Adam Smith
dubbed the “moral sentiments” as essential to the work of judgment.28
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1. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE

According to what I will call the “traditional understanding” of a number of contract law
doctrines familiar to virtually all first year law students, the good judging in which good judges
engage, when deciding cases governed by this sizeable part of the law, requires a moral
judgment about the distinctly moral quality of some sort of interaction between co-contracting
litigants. These doctrines include the unconscionability doctrine itself,29 but also rules regarding
the exercise of undue influence,30 bad faith,31 duress32 and constructive fraud33 in contracting
behavior likewise – themselves derived from two hundred year old common law principles, some
of which are derived from rules of equity of even older vintage. Thus, the judge in these
“policing” cases, by virtue of the governing law, must render a moral judgment about the moral
quality of one party’s contractual behavior vis-à-vis the other. He might have to decide, say,
whether a contractor’s negotiating behavior in the course of reaching an agreement was
unconscionable, or whether one contractor exercised undue influence in the bargaining process
over the other contractor, or whether one contractor's conduct constituted an unacceptable form
of duress, or exploited the duress of his co-contractor caused by other factors, or whether the
contractor's behavior for any of these reasons or any other was an exercise of bad faith, or
whether the contractor's seeming deceit constituted a form of constructive fraud – whether he
failed to disclose something about the value of the subject matter of the contract that in all good
conscience, given the circumstances, really should have been disclosed. The judge may have to
decide whether the term or contract reached through any of these forms of morally dubious
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behavior was so unconscionably one-sided as to “shock the conscience.”34 All of these legal
“terms of art”–unconscionability, undue influence, bad faith–unlike what we are typically talking
about when we invoke that phrase “terms of art,” retain, in law, their quite ordinary and
explicitly moral meaning, as understood by, well, everybody who's been raised well. Did the
party’s overbearing behavior in procuring a contract “shock the conscience”? Did it pass the
“smell test”? Did it make you want to puke? Were the lopsided terms the parties eventually
agreed to in themselves unconscionable? Did a loan contract bind the debtor to an interest rate
that was obscenely usurious? Did a contract's lopsided terms–a sale of a plot of land for a
hundredth or thousandth of its market value, or a loan with a 200% interest rate–violate various
rules of equity, that venerated five (six?) hundred-year-old body of moral principles from which
many of these “policing doctrines” are derived?35 Did the defendant engage in “sharp practice”
with someone who was obviously suffering from depression,36 or from a manic mood disorder,
or a mental incapacity, and who quite evidently could not protect his or her own interest, and was
the stronger party’s conduct in the face of all this just a little “too clever by half”? Did the
stronger party exercise good faith throughout the negotiating process? Did one contractor take
unfair advantage of the other’s manifest need, or vulnerability, or age, or disability, or ignorance,
lack of education, or mental infirmity? Did one contractor deliberately attempt to cloud the cocontractor's common sense, or assessment of his economic self-interest? Was the contract for any
of these reasons just beyond the bounds of decency?
As has been pointed out by critics of these doctrines, the “traditional understanding” of
these various principles–and they were ubiquitous throughout the nineteenth century’s common
law of contract,37 and a prominent part of at least the initial understanding of the Uniform
Commercial Code’s codification of sales law in the 1950s38–requires the judge to engage in a
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form of decision making that is both explicitly moralistic, with respect to the parties' behavior,
and implicitly paternalistic, with respect both to the weaker party before him, and to future
parties who might be similarly situated. Let me take those in order. First, to decide whether a
contract is unconscionable or whether a contractor’s conduct was unduly influential in procuring
it (and so forth), the judge must decide himself or must instruct the jury to resolve what are
clearly questions of business ethics. “Unconscionable” and “undue influence” are, and are
understood to be, moral standards, which are then made relevant to the legal issue by virtue of
positive law. If the judge is to be true to the law, then he has to apply these moral standards (or
instruct a jury to), and if he is to apply these moral standards, he has to resort to the teachings of
his moral sense, or his moral conscience, and not only the teachings of precedent, of Blackstone,
and of statutes. Whether or not a contract term is “unconscionable” depends upon what one
decides of the applicability of that term of condemnation in the context of dealings between the
two people, as judged by a test of conscience. Likewise, whether undue influence was brought to
bear by one party upon the other, or whether a party exercised bad faith, or engaged in
constructive fraud, or exploited the other party's distress, depends upon the moral quality of the
relationship between the parties, as judged by somebody's conscience. If a judge decides it was,
he should so hold, and according to the law, he should then strike the contract or the offensive
term. The “sharp dealer,” the party “too clever by half,” will be deprived of the value of the
contract (although he might have recourse to some more limited remedy, such as restitution, so
as not to allow the weaker party to profit from the entire ill-fated transaction), and the weaker
party will be relieved of the burden of performing an unconscionable contract, and all of this will
happen for straightforwardly moral reasons: the contract, according to the judge who so held, is
for some reason immoral. Thus–the “moralism” of these decisions.
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Now, on the paternalism. One effect of striking the contract, in a common law system, is
that some sort of rule of the case emerges–or at least might emerge–from each decision in which
the judge writes an opinion and attempts to offer a holding. What that rule is might be subject to
debate or interpretation, but that a written judicial decision does sometimes produce such a
holding, with a range of possible meanings, really is not. The result of a decision to strike a
contract or term as unconscionable, unduly influenced, procured through bad faith, or under
duress, then, might be felt not only by the parties immediately affected, but by all “similarly
situated persons” who might enter a similar deal after the decision is rendered, and who might
therefore be properly subject to the holding that emerges from the decision. So, when a contract
or a contract term is struck as unconscionable, or a tactic as unduly influential, or a clause as
unenforceable because lacking in good faith, then that contract, term, or tactic is unavailable to
future parties who might want to use such a term, tactic, or contract in similar circumstances.
The now iconic facts of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, (if not the case
itself) decided in the 1960s, provides a serviceable example of both. In Williams, the cause at
issue was the cross-collateral term in the installment sales contract for consumer goods between
the retail store and the indigent customer in that case, by which the buyer posted as “collateral”
past products purchased from the store, in exchange for a sale of new goods paid for over time in
installments, such that the buyer could lose all past purchased products if she defaulted on a
payment for the later-purchased goods. Judge Skelly Wright famously decided as a matter of law
that the trial judge had the power to rule that “”this cross-collateral term was unconscionable.
Certainly if the trial court had so ruled (the case was settled instead), not only would the plaintiff
in that case–Mrs. Williams herself–have been relieved of the obligation to go through with the
contract (or pay damages) and the seller have been deprived of damages tied to breach of the
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unconscionable clause, but other buyers and sellers who might have wanted to include such a
term would henceforth not have been able to do so. No future seller of consumer goods operating
in low income neighborhoods would include a cross-collateral loan term, once the word was out
on the street, so to speak, that a judge would be likely to strike the term as unconscionable. The
seller who is not able to include such a term would lose some real and expected income by virtue
of that fact: such a seller might after all be making very risky loans to poor customers, a steady
percentage of whom will in fact default. If a seller does not have access to this possible form of
debt structuring for this class of consumers so as to maximize his recovery in the highly likely
event of default, and he wants to continue to do business in the neighborhood, he will obviously
have to raise prices to cover the shortfall. If all such sellers in the neighborhood are similarly
affected, what happens?
What happens, according now to legions of critics of this case, is that buyers, not sellers,
bear the cost. Those buyers in poor neighborhoods who would prefer to buy cheaper consumer
goods with onerous cross-collateral terms rather than higher priced goods without those terms–
perhaps because they predict that they will not default–are out of luck. They don’t have such a
package (low price plus cross-collateral loan terms) available to them. And, there may well be
plenty of buyers who would prefer a deal with cheaper prices and onerous cross-collateral terms
than to a deal with higher prices but no onerous loan terms. But this option is taken off the table
by virtue of Wright’s decision. And that might happen quite a lot, if these policing doctrines are
given free reign. Thus, poor consumers–one group the unconscionability doctrine is presumably
designed to protect–lose out.
The decision, then, of a judge to simply strike a contract term such as the cross-collateral
term that appeared in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company as unconscionable, is also
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paternalistic, and in two senses. The judge is first of all substituting his or her judgment for that
of the weaker contracting party in the transaction itself, as determined at the time the party
entered the contract. That party at that point in time viewed the contract in his or her own
interest, even knowing (presumably) that there was a possibility he or she would default and lose
the pre-purchased goods. The buyer, knowing that possibility, assumed the risk of her own future
default, and the court is in effect undoing that party's judgment that the risk was worth taking.
The judge, in striking the term as unconscionable, essentially makes the judgment that that
assumption of risk was ill advised at the time it was undertaken, not just in retrospect after the
risked event did indeed come to pass. But second, and more importantly, it is paternalistic with
respect to all those future parties who may be similarly situated to the parties involved in the
initial litigation. To return to the facts of Williams v. Walker-Thomas, if the trial judge were to
find the term unconscionable, he would in effect be deciding that whether or not they want to,
poor people should not purchase consumer goods under cross collateral loan terms. (Wright did
not himself make such a finding. He did, however, find that the trial judge had the power to
make such a ruling, if the trial judge found the term morally repugnant, and remanded39). Such a
judgment would imply that buyers are better off paying higher prices without those terms, or, if
they are priced out of the market, foregoing the goods entirely, regardless of what they want. Not
just Mrs. Williams, then, but all future consumers “in her shoes,” should the trial judge so hold in
Mrs. Williams' case, will have to either go without the stereo, television or Mixmaster they
would otherwise have been able to purchase, or they will have to pay higher prices. This entire
class of purchasers, not just Mrs. Williams, will not be able to buy goods on these terms,
essentially because some judge at some point decided that a term of this nature does not in fact
serve their interest, even though they believe that it does. They cannot buy goods under contracts
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with such a term, even if they want to, because in Wright’s view, the term is unconscionable.
Thus, the paternalism of the decision.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas was decided in the 1960s. What has happened to it in the
meantime? Basically, the unconscionability doctrine across the board, but also Skelly Wright’s
decision in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company in particular, have been the subject
of a steady drumbeat of criticism over the last thirty years, largely by scholars associated with
the law and economics movement.40 Their criticism, as well as the response to it, has largely
focused on what the legal economists regard as the unwarranted paternalism central to both the
unconscionability doctrine itself and Williams v. Walker-Thomas specifically. First, the critics
argue, there can be nothing morally objectionable about a seller’s conduct if both buyer and
seller agree to terms and there are no adversely affected third parties: indeed the resulting
contract is Pareto optimal. Everybody consented. There can’t possibly be grounds for moral
complaint to a contract to which everybody affected by it also consented.41 So the paternalism
can’t be justified on moral grounds. But furthermore, the judicial paternalism the doctrine
effectuates can’t be justified on welfare grounds either; in fact, it will work against, not for, the
interest of poor buyers, as those interests are reflected in those buyers' choices. These buyers,
like all buyers, have privileged access to their own preferences–no one knows their preferences
better than do they themselves. Those preferences are revealed in their market choices, as are all
buyers' preferences. Those choices, and hence those preferences, and therefore those buyers’
individual and collective welfare, are quite clear, relatively speaking: the buyers prefer low
prices and cross collateral terms, or they wouldn’t opt for them. They’d find some other seller
offering a different package, or they’d forego the purchase altogether. Their welfare, like
everyone’s welfare, is increased by satisfaction of their preferences, which are in turn revealed

18
through their market choices. Therefore, to remove this market choice by judicial fiat simply
reduces their welfare.
So, although it is natural to “feel badly” for Mrs. Williams herself, as one contemporary
commentator puts it42–to sympathize with her, in effect–that sentiment is actually at odds with
the interests, welfare, and desires of Mrs. Williams herself at the time of purchase, and with
others in Mrs. Williams’ circumstances. That “feeling” we might have, or that a judge might
have, for Mrs. Williams or for someone in her position, turns out to be a bad guide to the judicial
decision that might aim to improve her wellbeing. Thus, the moralism the judge deploys with
respect to the litigants before him, particularly those parts of it motivated by simple sympathy for
the plight of a poor and uneducated buyer trying to deal with a sophisticated retailer, leads
directly to a form of paternalism–in the form of the rule the court articulates–that decreases
rather than increases the welfare of the class of people toward whom the decision is directed. In
brief, it’s counter-productive.
That's the guts of the attack on this doctrine, and it has been made repeatedly and in
various forms over the last forty years since Williams was decided. It has even become, in a
sense, conventional wisdom, that what Skelly Wright did in Williams v. Walker-Thomas with all
the best motives in the world, was in fact bad for poor people. If you want to help poor and
uneducated buyers, for heaven's sake, hold them to their contracts. Judge Wright did the
contrary, and the result was nothing but a loss of consumer surplus that otherwise would have
been enjoyed by the very people he was trying to help.
That is where things stood, in the scholarly literature on Williams, until about the mid2000s. Since that time, however, a “behavioral” rather than “classical” economic analysis of both
Williams and the unconscionability doctrine has emerged, and with a strikingly different
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conclusion. In an exceptionally lucid article entitled “A Traditional and Behavioral Law and
Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company,” Professor Korobkin of
UCLA law school also decries Skelly Wright's reasoning in Williams v. Walker-Thomas–and the
reasoning he suggests the trial court below employ–but nevertheless ultimately defends the
decision's outcome, and on economic grounds. Sometimes, Korobkin explains, according to the
behavioral, as opposed to the classical legal economist, judicial paternalism of the sort deployed
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas might be justified, and more often than the classical legal
economist is inclined to believe. When it is though, it is justified not on the moralistic and
paternalistic grounds that individuals just don't know what is good for them, and that it’s wrong
for market actors to take advantage of people who are so deluded. Rather, limited judicial
paternalism might be occasionally justified on the grounds that sometimes individuals are not
very good at figuring out the probabilities that they'll get what they decide “is good for them”
from the various choices in front of them, given certain constraints on their abilities to reason
about their options. Paternalism is justified, in other words, not on the grounds that “people are
idiots” (as Duncan Kennedy artfully put the point in his classic defense of judicial paternalism
from the mid-1980s43) but rather, on the grounds that individuals – even smart and educated nonidiotic individuals–are often not particularly rational. We all suffer from a host of disabling
defects in our ability to make rational judgments, all of which cause many of us, maybe even
most of us, to misfire when choosing among the various options with which markets present us.
Free markets, it turns out, given irrational market actors, don’t so reliably maximize human
welfare, even in seemingly Pareto optimal transactions to which all parties consent. So, if it can
be clearly shown that a litigant and the class of which the litigant is representative in a contract-
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policing case suffers from some such defective decisional heuristic, then it’s sensible for the
court to adjust the contract accordingly.
And, in the Williams case itself, it's quite possible that Mrs. Williams was suffering the
effects of at least four such defective decisional heuristics, as Professor Korobkin goes on to
show in his article. Her decision was likely “selective,” meaning that she failed to consider all
attributes of the product she was buying (she focused on the stereo, rather than the payment
clause); non-compensatory (meaning that she likely failed to compare and trade-off the utility of
various attributes of the product against each other–the payment clause actually reduces the
expected utility of the stereo in ways she did not appreciate); her assessment of the probability
that she might default was likely and unduly discounted by virtue of her “overconfidence” or
“optimism bias,” making her incapable of accurately understanding the limits to her own power
to ward off bad future outcomes, and lastly, she likely underestimated the risk of bad outcomes
because of her unwarranted reliance on an “availability heuristic,” meaning that she unduly
relied on the low incidence of default among her friends and neighbors, when assessing her own
potential risks, simply because those were the comparators available to her. Given the likely
presence of all four of these defective decisional heuristics, her decision making was likely
unsound because it was irrational, and thus cannot be relied on to insure that the clause would
only be in the contract if efficient (if it truly benefitted sellers more than it hurt buyers, as
reflected in the price). Because of her defective decision making, a court then might be justified
in intervening–not so as to frustrate the welfare-maximizing efficiency-directed goals of contract
law and markets, as the critics of unconscionability have charged, but rather, to promote them.44
This is paternalistic, Korobkin concludes, but it is a limited and warranted paternalism: it takes
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the parties’ goals as given, but then nudges the parties in the direction they would have decided
in light of those goals, if they'd been behaving rationally.45
Thus, behavioral economists such as Korobkin, like the classical economists he
criticizes, urge courts to decide cases such as Williams by reference to the incentives the rule
creates for similarly situated parties in the future, rather than by reference to the mendacity of the
parties conduct or the outrageousness of the terms they strike. The behavioral economist,
however, is more skeptical about the rationality of all individuals' reasoning when entering
contracts. If the decisions made by contractors or potential contractors, and particularly
consumers, are systematically distorted by various psychological tendencies that inhibit full
rationality when they are seeking to translate their preferences into market choices, then there is
a narrow opening for warranted paternalism. This limited paternalism, however, has nothing to
do with and should not be motivated by a “shock to the conscience;” it has nothing to do with
moral revulsion over the unconscionability of a term, or bargaining tactics that are “too clever by
half,” or sharp dealing or shadowy bargaining. Rather, it should be motivated by a decision to
compensate, in the direction of efficiency and social wealth, for widely shared near-universal
design defects, so to speak, in our capacity to reason about risks and potential benefits. Turns
out, we're not very good at it. Where our contract choices show that, a court might be warranted
in undoing them.
The differences between classical and behavioral law and economics are important, but
nevertheless, their commonalities are more so, and at any rate it is their shared distance from the
traditional understanding of the unconscionability doctrine that I want to highlight. So let me
directly address those differences, beginning with the economic understanding, and then turning
to the traditional. First, as Seana Shiffrin has cleanly argued, law and economics scholars of the
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unconscionability doctrine have largely ignored that doctrine’s moralism.46 Second, legal
economists urge judges in these cases to focus not on the litigants’ behavior, but on the
incentives the rules that will emerge from these cases will create for future litigants. Third, and
related to the second point, both focus overwhelmingly on the terms of the contracts that are
challenged, rather than on the interaction of the parties before them. Fourth, and most important,
while the behavioral economist sees more irrationality in our choices, and thus more scope for a
doctrine such as unconscionability, both the behavioral and the classical economist see efficiency
or net social welfare as the goal that should guide the judge in these cases, rather than any
judgment about or even concern for either the wellbeing of the parties before him or the morality
of their conduct. Both see the role of the judge as being the third party who can facilitate
contractual relations by enforcing contracts against later-regretful parties, and who will thereby
set proper incentives that will efficiently increase social net welfare. The way to do that is to
enunciate rules that steer the parties and all future contractors toward wealth-maximizing
behavior–typically, although not always, by holding parties to the terms of their original bargain.
Departures from that premise should be articulated in rules that compensate for systematic
irrational behavior caused by decisional heuristics that cloud understanding of risk and benefit.
The transformed unconscionability doctrine more or less holds as much.
Now contrast that with the traditional understanding of the doctrine. The judge in an
unconscionability case might indeed “feel badly” for Mrs. Williams or someone in her position–
its only human nature to do so, as Korobkin points out.47 She's poor, uneducated, was dealing
with a sophisticated retailer, and she signed a contract with a ridiculously burdensome loan term
in order to secure the credit to purchase consumer goods that she didn't particularly need.
Likewise, such a judge might be appalled by the immoral behavior of the seller. On the
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traditional model, those feelings–feeling badly for the weaker party, and feeling appalled by the
conduct of the stronger–not only guide the judge's decision, they are virtually fully
determinative. The decision the judge makes, on the traditional understanding, is a decision
about the parties’ behavior, and it is both informed and motivated by moral feelings of empathy,
sympathy, and disgust. But those feelings, according to the legal economists, are not what the
judge should attend to. He should put them aside. Indeed, the judge in such a case should not
focus on the litigants at all. He should put them aside. Rather, the judge’s decision, according to
legal economists–and on both sides of the paternalism debate–should be guided exclusively by
concern for the incentives for future conduct that result from the rule his decision will create for
the class of people “similarly situated” to the litigants. The judge’s role in these cases is not to
judge the immorality of the conduct of the particular litigants that come before him, as judged by
a test of conscience. Rather, it is to put forward a rule that is as efficient as possible, or that leads
to the greatest net social welfare as understood in classical economic terms, for the type of
contracts of which the particular is an instance. This basic premise–that the judge’s role is to
specify a rule for future conduct that will incentivize wealth-maximizing behavior–is shared by
economics-minded commentators on both sides of these cases. That shared methodological
premise is at the heart of the new paradigm, and that shared premise, quite simply, is a
commitment to scientific rather than moral judging.

2. BRAVE NEW JUDICIAL WORLD THAT HAS SUCH PEOPLE IN’T
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Against these criticisms of the unconscionability doctrine and the transformation of that doctrine
to which those criticisms have led, scholars outside the law and economics movement–notably,
Duncan Kennedy,48 Anthony Kronman,49 and more recently, Seanna Shiffrin50–have defended
either the doctrine’s moralism or its strong paternalism as warranted. Oftentimes, of course,
buyers in contracts such as these will not know the terms they’re entering, and therefore may not
have made an informed decision regarding the purchase. Sometimes, however, they do know, as
might have Mrs. Williams–the Walker-Thomas Furniture store was well known in its
Washington DC neighborhood to its residents, as were its lending practices.51 Even with full
knowledge, Kennedy, Kronman and Shiffrin have all argued, albeit for different reasons,
moralistic or paternalistic intervention here might be justified. Shiffrin justifies intervention on
the grounds that judges–who are also of course themselves moral actors–have no business
coming to the aid of immoral business practices, while Kennedy argues that buyers often do not
know their own best interest and courts should help them promote that true interest where they
have the opportunity to do so. Kronman argues, on the more deontological grounds, that the lack
of knowledge, lack of integrity, or a lack of good judgment on the part of weaker parties
sometimes justifies the attendant loss of some level of individual autonomy. Buyers, after all, are
besotted by a consumerist culture that encourages sellers to construct consumer desire, and then
consumer demand, for products that have no connection to either need or pleasure. And
consumers fall for it, again and again and again. Consumers might fully understand the
consequences of default, but underestimate, and badly, the chance that they will default, not
because of hard-wired decisional defects in rationality, but because they have been overinfluenced by advertisers who encourage identification of viewers with successful and healthy
avatars. Similarly, consumers might fully understand what they want and don't what but not
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understand at all the precariousness of their own finances. Or, perhaps they simply want too
many things. They shouldn’t be buying television sets and stereos using bedroom furnishings as
collateral, when they are on a severely limited budget with eight children to feed, clothe, and
house. They are making bad choices, and those bad choices are adversely affecting not only
them, but their children and other dependents as well.
I generally side with the defenders of Judge Skelly Wright, Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Company, paternalism, moralism, and the unconscionability doctrine all. Consumer
sovereignty in these circumstances sometimes is not worth the pain it brings. That judgment is
well reflected in the hundreds of public law constraints on private contracting, from minimum
wage and maximum hour laws, to child labor laws, limits on the alienability of body parts, safety
and health regulations that constrain free contracting for employment, lemon laws that limit our
ability to buy cheap and defective automobiles free of the cost of limited warranties, nondisclaimable warranties of habitability, and so on. There should be nothing alarming about
common law doctrines that charge judges with the work of making the same sorts of judgments
on a case by case basis through a limited number of doctrines in the course of common law
reasoning.
Here, though, I don't want to focus on that debate. Rather, I want to note some
interrelated features of the traditional understanding of the unconscionability doctrine that I
believe are also emblematic of the traditional paradigm of judicial reasoning, and which are
almost routinely overlooked in these debates, by both critics and defenders of judicial
paternalism. Those features are jettisoned by the new paradigm of scientific judging, on which
the modern version of the unconscionability doctrine now rests.
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The first is the doctrine's moralism. As Seana Shiffrin suggests in her exhaustive
philosophical reconstruction of the unconscionability doctrine, this doctrine, developed in equity
courts, was motivated by moralistic revulsion at the contracting behavior of stronger parties, not
simply on paternalism per se.52 It didn't have as much to do with consumers' bad choices, as it
had to do with sellers' bad behavior. Courts didn’t want to lend their hand to immoral business
practices.53 The early nineteenth century cases in particular, more directly influenced by the
equitable maxims from which the policing doctrines themselves flowed, were quite explicit
about this. The judge’s decision that a contract term was “unconscionable,” was grounded not in
a desire to lay down a rule that would take a market option off the table for future parties, but
rather, in a moral reaction to the specific conduct and circumstances of the parties before him.
The twentieth century Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Store was not much different in that
regard. The offending term in Williams might, Judge Wright held, be found by the trial court to
be “unconscionable,” but not because Wright believed that from that moment forthwith, buyers
should never again be permitted to enter contracts with cross-collateral loan terms, even if they
want to, either because “people are idiots” or because they suffer from impaired rationality.
Rather, the trial court below should be empowered to strike the term if the judge found a cluster
of factors that pertained to the particular case to be, simply, unconscionable: that the buyer was
indigent, which the seller in that case knew, that the buyer had eight children, which the seller
knew, that on the buyer’s limited monthly income, the buyer could not possibly make the
requisite payments for the stereo she was seeking to purchase, which the seller either knew or
should have known, that the buyer had only a small balance outstanding on the prior purchased
items when she entered the offensive contract, which the seller knew, and that the buyer at the
time of default had long since paid considerably more than the purchase price of those prior
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purchased items, which of course the seller knew. On such a record, Wright held, the trial judge
below would be within his power to strike the term.54 All of these factors, about these people and
their interaction with each other, are what might collectively “shock the conscience.”
Second, the unconscionability doctrine, on the traditional model, rests on a particularism
that is not only not reducible to the rule that might follow from these cases, but that is actually in
considerable tension with it. This attribute of traditional judicial reasoning is completely elided
in the contemporary intra-economic debate over the purported paternalism at the heart of the
unconscionability doctrine. The judge deciding whether a contract or a term is unconscionable is
concerned with the specific situation of the parties before him, and the morality of their
interaction, as viewed against the backdrop of the commercial setting and informed by the
dictates of conscience. The decision that a term or entire contract is unconscionable, on the
traditional model, is about what these people did, as read against a backdrop of what they should
have done, and what others in their industry as well as the judge himself thinks about what they
did. It is not about a class of future contractors, or a generic type of term, or a form of contract,
and how some potential future class of contractors might be incentivized. It is about whether this
contractor’s past behavior did or did not conform to norms of decency. For the holding of a case
about unconscionability to even affect market transactions in the future, whether or not
“paternalistically,” it has to be cast in general terms. However, the moral emotion, as well as the
judicial reasoning, that actually prompts a judge to strike a contract term, consists largely of a
reaction to particular past behavior. The generality of the paternalistic rule that is the target of the
contemporary critics of unconscionability is at odds with the particularity of the situation that on
the traditional model is the object of the judge’s inquiry.
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Thus, it is inaccurate to say that Skelly Wright held in Williams v. Walker-Thomas that
cross-collateral terms in consumer contracts are unenforceable because they are unconscionable,
or even that such terms in contracts with poor people are unenforceable. The trial judge below
was repulsed by the reprehensible conduct of the particular seller in the case before him, and said
so. He also said that he didn't think he had the power to strike the contract.55 Skelly Wright on
appeal held that unconscionability is a constraint on common law contracts cases that arise in the
District of Columbia, and was so even before the passage of the UCC, so that, contrary to what
the trial judge believed about the state of the law, he did have the power to refuse to enforce the
contract if he found it to be unconscionable.56 The case was then settled. However, the finding of
unconscionability that might have been forthcoming had there been a retrial, and had the judge
followed Wright’s lead, would have followed from the trial judge’s response to the particular
circumstances, behavior, weaknesses, and needs of the parties.
Of course, had there been such a finding, and had the trial court written an opinion saying
as much, then that decision in turn might have constrained future market behavior. Or, it might
not have. The trial court might have found the term unconscionable only in these precise
circumstances: eight kids, the price of the collateral goods less than the amounts already paid,
non-essential item, and so forth. But the breadth of any rule the court might have articulated
would have been inversely related to the strength of the finding of unconscionability, not
correlated with it. So, if the trial judge had ultimately found that the seller’s callous disregard of
the specific circumstances besetting the plaintiff rendered that seller’s behavior unconscionable,
then the rule generated would have been quite specific, covering only circumstances in which
sellers behaved just as had the Walker-Thomas Furniture Store salesman, and with buyers
situated just as was Mrs. Williams. If, on the other hand, the judge had found that the cross-
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collateral clause itself was unconscionable, regardless of the circumstances or behavior of either
party, then the rule, as well as its paternalistic impact, might have been overbroad, because it
would have been well beyond the circumstances that gave rise to the moral revulsion that
prompted it.
Third and most important, both the backward-looking, particularistic, and moralistic
ground of an unconscionability decision, and the forward-looking paternalistic rule that might
follow from it on the traditional model, should be informed by the judge’s moral sense–and
hence, in part, by moral emotions and moral sentiments, including both empathy and sympathy.
The judge might or might not be morally repulsed by the parties’ behavior. He won’t know,
however, whether the behavior is morally objectionable or not unless he can empathize with both
parties to the transaction, and then register a stronger sympathetic response to either one or the
other. That’s just the nature of the beast. If the commercial behavior of this retailer was shocking
to the conscience, it was so because of the unreasonably exploitative nature of the seller’s tactics
and the over-exposure of the buyer to excessive and unreasonable risk, as well as excessive and
unreasonable costs of default. One cannot reach a judgment on either prong of this without
exercising one’s moral sense, and hence employing one’s moral emotions. The background
moral norms of the industry play a role, but not an exhaustive one. Whether the seller’s behavior
was reprehensible or not depends upon the judge’s moral sense, and the exercise of that moral
sense depends on his employment of his capacity for empathic regard for both litigants. That
empathic regard, in turn, facilitates his sympathetic engagement with the buyer’s struggles, the
market imperatives of the seller’s business and then with whether or not the seller treated the
buyer decently in light of those struggles and imperatives. This is the basis of his decision.

30
These traditional structural features of the judge’s role are highly visible within the
contours of the unconscionability doctrine: again, unconscionability law has its historical roots in
“equity”, which was for several centuries a separate body of procedures and institutions,
governed not by legal rules but by principles, themselves squarely premised on moral truths, and
not particularly generative of legal precedent and holdings. Nevertheless, the three structural
features I’ve noted above–the moralism, the backward-looking particularism, and the role of
moral sentiments such as sympathy and empathy–of the traditional understanding of the
unconscionability doctrine were not peculiar to that doctrine, and not at all peculiar to either
policing doctrines or those policing doctrines that stem from equity. Rather, they were part of the
traditional paradigm of good judging in common law cases quite generally. The judge in
common law cases across the board was expected to understand the situation of the litigants
before him or her, and make a judgment about their situation against the backdrop of pre-existing
norms, many of which–not just a few–were quite explicitly moral in content. Some came from
industry standards, some from the community’s positive morality, and some were simply
universal moral standards outright. So: a defendant did or did not act “reasonably,” when it
neglected to insulate an electrical wire along a bridge on which children played. Whether other
bridge owners did so is relevant to the resolution of that issue, as should be the expense of the
insulation and the probability of an electrical injury. But neither exhausts the inquiry. The judge
must decide whether or not the failure to insulate the wire or place a warning sign was
reasonable (or instruct a jury to do so), not solely whether or not other bridge makers thought it
was reasonable. Similarly, a judge must decide whether a plaintiff did or did not “accept a risk”
of injury when he foolishly boarded an obviously defectively designed motorcycle; whether a
seller did or did not “unduly influence” a buyer with overbearing sales tactics, a buyer was or
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wasn’t under duress when she foolishly agreed to a contract in an abortion clinic that
relinquished too many of her rights against potential malpractice; whether a commercial dealer
did or did not act in “good faith” when he reduced the quantity delivered under an outputs
contract to zero; whether the price the parties agreed to for a piece of land was or wasn’t
unconscionably low or the interest rate unconscionably high. These moralistic norms of conduct–
the negligence standard itself, the acceptance of risk doctrine, undue influence, good faith
constraints on output contracts, duress rules and of course the unconscionability doctrine–
permeated the common law; indeed, moralistic norms well outnumbered the non-moralistic
norms in tort law. When Holmes railed against moral categories, words, and turns of phrase in
the “Path of the Law,” urging for the sake of clarity that we purge moral terms such as “duty,”
“recklessness,” “intent,” and so on from consciousness as well as the law reports by “washing
the law in cynical acid”57–thereby flushing them out of the legal system–he was not attacking a
straw person, or a vague idea. Moral norms constituted the content of much of the common law.
Unconscionability was one area in which they did so explicitly. It was certainly not the only such
area. The common law was moralistic, through and through.
And second, not just unconscionability cases, not just the policing doctrines, and
certainly not just equity cases, but in all common law cases, according to the traditional
paradigm of good judging, the breadth of a rule generated by a decision’s holding was a function
of the importance of distinguishing, particular facts. On the traditional understanding, a judge
does not enunciate rules at all. Rather, he enunciates holdings. There is a difference. The holding
of a case is subject to a particular kind of interpretation and can change over time. It has this
open-ended, always-subject-to-interpretation quality, in fact, precisely because it is not a rule,
and doesn't operate as one. Its content is subject to argument. It is narrow, when understood as
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contingent upon a sizeable number of the case’s distinguishing facts, and broad, if contingent on
only a few. It can be both at once, to different readers. It can be narrow one day and broad the
next. Neither lawyer is in bad faith or misrepresenting a thing, when one argues “for” a narrow
holding of a case decided yesterday, and another argues “for” a broad holding of the same case.
Which it is depends not upon anything embedded in the case itself but upon the use to which the
holding is later put, the art of the lawyer or judge using the case, and the circumstances of the
new case in which the holding is invoked as authority. All of this is what is distinctive about the
skill of reading and using cases in legal and judicial argument; all of this also distinguishes the
judicial work of articulating holdings from the legislative or administrative art of issuing rules.
The ability to read and use case-law by extracting holdings from a past case in such a way as to
render the case authoritative for a present case is at least a part of the distinctive skill of good
lawyering. It is not as large a part of the lawyer’s professional life as Langdell believed it to be,
for sure. Law schools may well do contemporary law students a major disservice by focusing so
exclusively on this work, this skill, or this art, particularly in the first year of law school. Surely
students should learn much else besides, including the rule-making arts of legislation and the
dispute-resolving functions of arbitration, and mediation. But nevertheless, the work of
extracting the holding of a case by determining the breadth or narrowness of that holding by
reference to the relevant facts, so as to apply it meaningfully to another “set of facts,” is
unquestionably a major part of a lawyer and judge’s education, as well it should be.
Third, doing this well depends upon use of capacities for both empathy and sympathy–
what philosophers used to call the moral sense. As discussed above, the bare work of analogy
depends upon empathic ability. But more particularly, application of the relevant substantive law
does as well. To decide that a contract is unconscionable requires empathic engagement with the

33
situation of both parties, and a dollop of situation sense as well. To decide that it was
unreasonable not to insulate the wire on the bridge, or that it was so clearly not unreasonable as
to not permit a jury to even consider the question, or that it was undue influence on the part of a
medical professional to convince a young woman to sign a contract relinquishing legal rights in
an abortion clinic, or that a usurious interest rate was agreed to only under duress, all requires
empathetic engagement with both parties' perspectives. To then decide to come to the aid of one
or the other of the parties, and relieve the distress or compensate for the injury or release
someone from the obligation to perform a contract or pay damages, requires sympathy. One is
inclined to help someone in such a situation if one has first empathized with that party and their
adversary, and then finds their situation sympathetic. At least on the traditional understanding of
good judging, the judge must embrace, not shy away from, his capacity for empathetic and
sympathetic engagement with the parties before him.
So, the contemporary understanding of at least the unconscionability doctrine–forward
looking, anti-empathic, and focused on future parties and general rules–is at odds not only with
the traditional understanding of that doctrine, but with the traditional paradigm of good judging.
Is this just an anomaly? Maybe the unconscionability doctrine, as currently understood by legal
economists, is simply a poor fit with adjudicative method. The other possibility though is that the
revised understanding of the unconscionability doctrine evidences the prevalence, or at least the
power, of a new or emerging paradigm of judging with which the revised understanding is fully
compatible. If so, then the structural features noted above regarding the ways in which judges
should reason in unconscionability cases are true across the board: they hold for judging, period,
not just for judging unconscionability doctrines. If so, then it is the new paradigm of judging, not
just a new understanding of the unconscionability doctrine, that is explicitly and emphatically
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anti-moralistic, forward rather than backward looking, abstract rather than particularist, and
reliant upon social science and empirical method, rather than empathic regard followed by
sympathy, for guidance. Is this right? Do anti-moralism, non-particularism, and a turn toward a
social-scientific regard for the decisional life of law's subjects (and away from ethical judgment
informed by empathic regard for the subjective wellbeing of litigants) characterize our new
paradigm of judging? Is scientific judging, rather than empathic judging, the new paradigm, the
ideal toward which our judges are being urged to aim?
Quite possibly. Beginning with Holmes’s pithy declarations on the topic,58 continuing
through a good bit of legal realist writing, and now in a wide swath of contemporary law and
economics scholarship, twentieth century legal scholars have urged, in opposition to traditional
understandings of the goals of adjudication, that net social welfare, particularly as created
through voluntarist transactions, should be the goal that judges pursue when deciding common
law cases of tort and contract, rather than the vindication of moral principle, or the protection of
parties from their own worst instincts, or the actions of private actors that would take advantage
of them.59 The consequence of this has been in part, but only in part, to tilt common law
adjudication toward libertarian outcomes–toward, rather than against Herbert Spencer's social
statics, in ironic point of fact.60 Another and somewhat less noted consequence of our journey
down this particular Holmesian path of the law has been a re-definition of basic common law
concepts and categories away from their natural language and moral or moralistic meanings,
toward an amalgam of the purely positivistically legal, and the social-scientific. Thus,
“unconscionability” is redefined to mean a contract that exploits a decisional heuristic that tilts
buyers toward irrationality in markets.61 Likewise, and much earlier in the century, “contract”
has been redefined to mean a “promise that either an event will come to pass or its equivalent
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value in dollars will be paid,” rather than an exchange of promises carrying with them a moral
obligation of their performance.62 “Negligence” has come to mean “conduct with regard to which
the expected damage it might cause times its probability exceeds the cost of prevention,”63 rather
than that which a prudent and reasonable person should avoid, and “duty” means the absence of
immunity from the obligation to act. “Tort law” is a catch-all word for liability that should be
imposed if and only if transaction costs have rendered impossible a voluntary transaction
between an actor and victim, with its content determined by the hypothetical contracts those
parties would have entered into if they could have, rather than by any conception of what a
healthy life with sensibly conscribed duties of care for others should entail.64 Likewise, a
contractual promise that is breached entails a duty to pay damages only if the expected payoff of
the promise is higher than the promisor's expected cost of performance, and not otherwise–and
so on.65 All of this is just as Holmes hoped for in The Path of the Law, and all of it has more or
less come to pass; the common law has been bathed in cynical acid, albeit with no guarantee that
the bath has brought us the added clarity he hoped would be the happy result. One murkier result
of that bath, whether or not it is one he championed, is that as in the unconscionability cases,
judicial outcomes in a wide range of cases–torts cases that turn on definitions of negligence or
contributory negligence, efficient breaches of contract, outputs contracts, duty or lack of duty
cases–do not turn on the judge’s sense of the moral quality of the interaction between the
litigants. Rather, such cases turn on the judge's understanding of how the incentives he creates
through the rules he fashions might impact the welfare of others, as ascertained through a quasiscientific study of their choices, hypothetical, implied, or otherwise.
Likewise, for a wide range of cases, scholars increasingly urge that common law judges
should focus less on the litigants, and more on the future transactions or dealings that the rules
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they articulate will effect. Law and economics scholars in particular quite routinely urge that
judging should be neither backward-looking nor particularistic. But the view is by no means
limited to law and economics theorists. Most mainstream legal scholars – including liberal,
progressive and critical legal scholars–concur that adjudication should be forward-looking and
general, and not limited to the particulars of the facts before it. Adjudication should be, in short,
legislative in form and outlook. Given their indeterminacy, precedent and past cases in general
provide little guidance in any event. Courts should seek to maximize welfare. Their work is no
different than the legislator’s; it's simply housed in a different building.
This consensus that adjudication should be forward-looking and general, rather than
backward-looking and particularistic, has its origin of course in realist reforms and
jurisprudence: the true motive and meaning of a court's decision, according to Holmes and his
legions of twentieth century followers, is “social policy.” The judge should act as a quasilegislator within the interstices of rules laid down. The common law is simply an incomplete
codification; the judge's work is to complete it. On this basic realist point, left-leaning critical
scholars are in complete accord with libertarian-leaning legal economists: that the judge acts as a
quasi-legislator is simply a reiteration of the lack of any substantive difference between law and
politics. There are of course political differences between these groups of scholars and the
differences show up in the scholarship: Kennedy and Kronman, for example, embrace
paternalism in both the legislative and adjudicative sphere on political and moral grounds, while
Epstein and Posner resist it in both. But they are all as one on the nature of judging. The judge's
job is to maximize net social welfare. They differ only over their conceptions of in what that
welfare might consist. They don't differ on the judge's role in creating it.

37
And lastly, the new paradigm of judging has no need for the exercise of judicial moral
sentiment, or the faculties of sympathy and empathy at the core of that human capacity.
Empathy, in fact, is basically the collateral damage in this ideological war between traditional
and scientific paradigms of adjudication. Neither empathy nor sympathy is required by the new
model, for any of the judicial tasks for which it was seemingly central, in the old model. The
judge on the new model is less concerned with precedent, so there is no need to engage in the
sort of empathetic imaginings that Susan Bandes and others have characterized above as
essential to analogical reasoning. Nor need the judge exercise whatever moral sense (or
sentiment) is required to appreciate and apply moralistic legal categories. Once the law is washed
in cynical acid, the judge has no need for those moral sentiments that might register engagement
with the moralistic categories that have been washed away. The judge need not empathically
walk in litigants' shoes before judging them: his decision should attend, rather, to the incentives
or disincentives for future conduct that his decision might create, with the goal of maximizing
future net social welfare. When doing so, he might have to acknowledge, at least if he attends to
the teachings of behavioral economics, the need for limits on consumer voluntarism in unfettered
markets, and might accordingly be inclined to enunciate rules to that effect. He will then have to
decide whether a group of buyers or market actors might be susceptible to a decisional heuristic
that will pervert the rationality of their choices on various markets. If so, legal rules that will
restrain those markets might come into play: limits on the waivability of warranties, the
unconscionability doctrine itself, tort-based limits on contractual agreements, and so forth. But
the target of this paternalistic intervention is decidedly not human suffering, but rather, human
irrationality, and the goal of it is not relief from suffering or immoral or unethical business
behavior, but rather, correction of irrational choice. The determination, then, of whether or not
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there is such a failing of rational choice requires deference to social-scientific expertise on the
behavior of actors in markets, not empathic engagement with litigants. Whether or not the judge
ought to respond, and how, once a finding of such irrationality has been made, depends on the
judge's view of the relation between the ideals of rationality, and his understanding of the
importance of individual choice, even assuming perverse irrationalities. Should he favor the
former–call it welfare, ideally and rationally construed–he might intervene into market choices,
re-jiggering in line with what a perfect choice would have yielded. If he favors the latter–call it
liberty–he might let the perverse or irrational market choice lie. Either way, though, the decision
is not informed by empathy, and most decidedly not motivated by either a disgust with immoral
business behavior, or with a sympathetic identification with the plight of litigants, poor or
otherwise, who might be seeking relief from the suffering occasioned by their own ill-conceived
choices.

3. THE ROOTS, APPEAL AND LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC JUDGING

A full history of the emergent paradigm of scientific judging is obviously beyond the scope of
this discussion, but it's worth identifying just three of the “signposts along the road”66 originating
either in law or sister disciplines. The first was a development in American legal theory; the
second, a development in economics; and the third, in political theory.
First, legal theory. In the first three decades of the last century, “legal realists” famously
rebelled against the then-traditional paradigm of moralistic judging, as well as the “brooding
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omnipresence in the sky” that informed it, by which they meant the common law in general, and
Langdellian pretenses of the common law's autonomy and “completeness” in particular. That
“brooding omnipresence,” it’s now easy to see in retrospect, came with some profoundly
conservative biases: biases toward capital and against labor, for stronger contracting parties and
against weaker ones, and for business and industry as against their victims, both on the job in
dangerous workplaces, and off, in rural fields and urban streets alike. Realists railed against the
identification of the nineteenth-century common law with both an immutable natural law and
with constitutional law that favored individual rights of property and contract over collective
interests, and all with a moralistic overlay, and they found plenty of allies in the progressive
politics of their era, from labor organizers to some state court judges, a somewhat progressive
Congress, FDR's White House, the American Pragmatist movement in the academy, and
eventually of course a majority of the Supreme Court. The existing common law, the realists
argued, was not perfect, not complete, and most important, not in line with the needs of the
people. Judges of the common law and Justices of the Supreme Court, with Oliver W. Holmes
leading the charge in both fora, were broadly encouraged to find a way to turn away from
common law precedent, as a guide to both adjudication and constitutional interpretation.
If the common law is not only unduly protective of capital, but also incomplete and at
best an indeterminate guide for decision making in any event, then what? To what should courts,
judges, and lawyers turn, when filling the interstitial gaps in the law, if not from general
principles drawn from prior cases? First Holmes and then the realists had an imperfect answer,
but they did have an answer to that question: judges should turn to the then-nascent social
sciences. The lawyer and judge of the future, again, would be the man of the slide rule and
economics, not the man of Blackstone, precedent, and the past. Science should guide the judge's
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inquiry into the content of social welfare, and social welfare should guide his inquiry into the
content of the law. Science should be the method, and welfare the goal.
And what are the teachings of the sciences, on the question of social welfare? How do
we ascertain welfare? The second signpost, I believe, came from one influential answer to that
question that emerged from mid-century economics. Central to mid-century economics was the
claim, which eventually became an article of faith, that actors cannot intersubjectively compare
the subjective utilities of other persons.67 The gulf between our minds is just not bridgeable. We
cannot know whether a pinprick hurts someone else more than a broken leg from a fall,68 to
paraphrase a twentieth century version of this claim; we cannot know whether pushpin is more or
less pleasurable, welfare enhancing, or worthy, than poetry, to borrow from Jeremy Bentham’s
formulation of a related skepticism.69 We are all too different to make such comparisons by
generalizing from our own experience, and the difficulties in grasping the hedonic pleasures and
pains of others bar our ability to make such comparisons directly. The consequence of a firm
belief in this severe limitation on our abilities, for purposes of any political activity that aims to
increase welfare, is profound. One person, whether judge or legislator, with the power to
distribute goods or services or resources who aims to do so in a welfare-enhancing way cannot
truly know whether one person's enjoyment of a dollar, or sufferance of the infliction of a kick in
the shins, is “comparable” to, or lesser than or greater than, that of another. We can't truly know
that a rich man's enjoyment of a marginal dollar is less than a poor man's, or that the kick in the
shins hurts less than the broken bone, or more than the pinprick. Therefore, the simple
quantitative or additive function that Bentham envisioned, when he imagined utility metrics as a
pathway to welfare maximization, is just dysfunctional. They don’t work. We can't know overall
welfare by adding utiles, where utiles are tied to subjective pleasure, because we can't compare
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them across persons. The empathic knowledge of the subjectivity of others–the knowledge that
the loss of a dollar by a rich person actually is less painful than the loss of a dollar by a poor
person, or that the loss of collateral is so painful to a buyer as not to be worth the loss of the
consumer surplus that might be enjoyed, should a clause requiring that loss be allowed is just not
up to the task of generating enough information to actually answer questions of total welfare that
in turn require that sort of interpersonal comparative knowledge. And this is empathic knowledge
which any potential sympathizer who aims to increase welfare will need, whether the
sympathizer be Adam Smith or Karl Marx. We can't empathize our way to the knowledge that
Bentham's utility calculus demands.
If we want to maximize social welfare, then, as Holmesian realists proclaimed, whether
through adjudication or through legislation, the best and only window, so to speak, into the
subjective individual utility functions of others, and therefore into their subjective wellbeing, is
revealed preferences, as demonstrated by choices in open markets. In part, and as commonly
understood, the inclination of contemporary utilitarians, welfare economists and others to rely on
revealed preferences as a window into subjective welfare–and in turn to rely on fulfilled market
choices as a vehicle for maximizing the satiation of those preferences–is because, absent
infirmity, the individual himself has come to be regarded, for familiar anti-paternalist or Millian
reasons, as the best judge of his own interest. But not exclusively. Reliance on preference as a
window into wellbeing, and on fulfillment of choices that reflects preference as the best vehicle
for maximizing that wellbeing, is also the natural consequence of the assumption that came to be
widely held among economists at mid-century, to wit, that the individual is just as incapable of
knowing the subjective utility of others, as he is omniscient regarding his own. He knows his
own wellbeing perfectly or at least better than others do, for Millian or liberal reasons. As
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important, though, he knows the wellbeing, pleasures, and pains of others not at all–he can't
know or compare their subjective utility with that of others. Put the Millian and economic claims
together and they yield this sum: the individual can't be wrong about his own utility functions,
and he can’t be right about the subjective pains and pleasures of others. The individual's
preferences are best revealed through his choices, and his choices are fully discoverable through
the empirical methods of the social sciences.
If we take seriously the inability to intersubjectively compare utilities, then it directly
follows that empathy is both inadequate to the task of learning enough of the subjective
wellbeing of another so as to increase social welfare–we can't intersubjectively compare the
subjectivity of others–as well as unnecessary. Revealed preferences are what we need to know;
indeed, they're all we need know, and furthermore, all we can know. The contemporary ubiquity
of this claim – the claim that we are incapable of intersubjective utility judgments, that we just
don't know whether someone is more hurt by a broken knee than a foregone candy bar, given the
irreducible differences between us and the difficulty of penetrating the mind of another–is, thus,
the second “signpost along the way.” With the acceptance of the claim that one moral agent
cannot possibly intersubjectively compare utilities, I believe, came a degradation of the
acceptability of moral judging that required empathic and sympathetic engagement with the
wellbeing of others–an engagement with others that requires precisely the intersubjective
comparisons of those others' mental states that the economic hypothesis warns are impossible.
Moral judging then took another hit.
The third signpost along the path from moral to scientific judging was the rise, two thirds
of the way through the twentieth century, of a theory of liberalism steadfastly committed to state
neutrality regarding questions concerning the nature or content of the good life, in both political
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theory and in jurisprudence, that coincided in time with a turn toward robust libertarianism in the
country's politics. Both counsel deference to an individual's assessment of his own welfare, and
both then counsel likewise a deference to either markets or democracy on questions regarding the
content of the social welfare, to which courts should attend. If we synthesize all of this – the
forward looking jurisprudence of the realists, economists' skepticism regarding our ability to
understand empathically the pains of pleasures of others, and political liberals' disdain for public
morality and the rise of liberal and libertarian theories of the state committed to neutrality on
questions of the good in the 1970s through to the present–the increasing dominance of scientific
judging, and the demise of moral judging, I believe, is hardly surprising.
There are, finally, additional emotional or indeed sentimental reasons, I believe, for the
appeal of scientific adjudication to contemporary scholars. Let me point to two. First, legal
scholars and judges now fear the erratic results suggested by untethered empathic adjudication
more than we did in the past, partly because we now, in contrast to then, broadly assume a
radical indeterminacy in pre-existing law. Radical legal indeterminacy is no longer the view of
outliers; it is, rather, a widely shared conventional wisdom. Obviously, scientific judging in part
appeals, simply because it speaks to the craving for certainty in the face of a presumed
indeterminacy that underscores a good bit of both law and legal writing. If indeterminate law
can't provide certainty, and many judges and lawyers and likely most scholars are convinced it
can't, then scientific ideals might.
In larger part, though, I believe, the continuing appeal of scientific adjudication as an
ideal of judging stems, at least in legal scholarship, from the blurring of legislation and
adjudication, as well as of administration and adjudication. The claim that there is no difference
between the goals of administration, legislation and adjudication is now widely shared not only
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among law and economics scholars, but also by critical legal scholars and to a lesser degree
mainstream legal scholars as well. Both Richard Posner and Duncan Kennedy have argued, in
very different contexts of course, that judges are in effect quasi-legislators, and should reason as
such. For Kennedy, our resistance to this idea stems from a residual false consciousness that
accords fetishistic validity to democratically obtained ends, and for Posner, it stems from an oldfashioned, pre-pragmatic, pre-Holmesian faith in the wealth-enhancing virtues as well as
coherence of nineteenth century common law.70 For most legal thinkers today, the judge is a
quasi legislator. The ideal of good adjudication, then, should not be notably different from the
ideal of good legislation.
So, where does empathy fit, in the skill set, so to speak, for the ideal legislator? For many
political theorists today, and for many scholars of legislation in the legal academy, it ranks low.
Both public choice theorists and their critics value social-scientific expertise–not empathy–as
that which should guide legislation and administration.71 On this view, which I am not
commending, legislators should be committed to improving the welfare of all, but the tie that
binds them to that common good is electoral accountability, not moral sentiment. If the electoral
system is working properly, legislators can make legislative decisions on the basis of their own
self-interest, and the value of those decisions, in effect, will trickle down to those to whom the
legislator is electorally responsive. So, if adjudication is truly no different in goal from
legislation–law is politics, judges no less than legislatures aim and should aim for social welfare,
as Holmes and his followers all said–then there is no reason on earth that their methods should
differ. Judges too, then, should use the slide rule rather than the heart to ascertain social welfare,
and then should rule accordingly.
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Finally, what's to lose, as we move from moral to scientific ideals of adjudication? I think
we lose two things of consequence. First, we lose the moral interpretation of many of our
common law concepts that have been given articulation in moral adjudication over the last
century and a half. We lose, for example, the idea of a contract as a promise, rather than a
prediction of the occurrence of either an event or a damage payoff. We lose the idea of a tort as a
harm occasioned by individual recklessness or negligence and born by relatively innocent
individuals that therefore deserves recompense, rather than the terms of a hypothetical contract
between strangers who can't make deals in the face of transaction costs. We lose the idea of the
“policing doctrines,” such as the unconscionability and undue influence rules, as distinctively
moral limits on market behavior rather than as rules that attempt to capture and correct for
heuristic defects in rationality, and we lose the last thread of a connection between our current
legal doctrine in these common law areas to the abandoned moral principles at least sometimes
employed by the equity courts of the past.
Second, and I believe of greater consequence (these judicially created common law
moral rules are of limited scope, no matter how they are defined), or at least what I've tried to
stress here, we lose the distinctive adjudicative arts. We lose, for example, the idea of the
difference, and the idea that there is a difference, between a holding and a rule. More broadly, we
lose the idea of the common law and of the judicial opinion as a repository for wisdom that can
flexibly mutate to meet changing facts, but that emerges from particularistic decision making. Of
course, we gain as well: we gain, perhaps, more finely tuned rules, a better sense of when market
transactions are driven by irrationality, and, at least if judicial decision making is effective, we
gain a more rational marketplace. In that rational utopia, judicial empathy has no place, but nor is
it needed; we will all do just fine on our own deciding what pleases us.
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No matter how we regard it, though, it is clear that judicial empathy has no role to play in
scientific judging. Thus my conclusion: the demise of judicial empathy is best regarded as a
piece of the collateral damage in the movement from traditional, moralistic, and particularistic
reasoning, to forward-looking scientific adjudication. Empathy is as irrelevant to the new
paradigm of judging as it was central to the old. It can only do mischief. No wonder then, that
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, no less than the Chief Justice, have so little to say in its favor.
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